BGP
Latest News
08-01-2024: BGP in 2023 - BGP updates. [Geoff Huston]
07-01-2024: BGP in 2023 - have we reached peak IPv4? [Geoff Huston]
05-01-2025: A “ridiculously weak“ password causes disaster for Orange España. [Ars Technica] [Kentik] [BenJojo]
08-11-2023: Open BGP daemons - there's so many of them. [ipSpace]
07-11-2023: Rapid progress on BGP Route Origin Validation. [ipSpace]
29-08-2023: Grave flaws in BGP error handling. [benjojo]
13-05-2023: Pakistan shut down the Internet, but failed to stop protests. [BBC News]
30-04-2023: BGP zombie outbreak on Juniper routers. [ipSpace] [APNIC]
30-03-2023: ChatGPT on BGP routing security. [ipSpace]
Latest Articles
eBGP-only service provider network. [ipSpace]
FRRouting claims iBGP loopbacks are inaccessible. [ipSpace]
BGP AS numbers for a private MPLS/VPN bBackbone. [ipSpace]
Applying BGP policy templates. [ipSpace]
BGP graceful restart considered harmful. [ipSpace]
BGP challenge - merge autonomous systems. [ipSpace]
The BGP Origin attribute. [ipSpace]
The BGP MED saga. [ipSpace]
Can a router use the default route to reach BGP next hops? [ipSpace]
Why do we need BGP identifiers? [ipSpace]
Is BGP TTL security any good? [ipSpace]
Outages caused by bugs in BGP implementations. [ipSpace]
Hacking BGP for fun and profit. [ipSpace]
Older News
06-02-2022: Performance testing of commercial BGP. [Elegant Network]
06-10-2021: Learning from Facebook's mistakes. [Geoff Huston]
30-08-2021: Comparing open source BGP stacks with Internet routers. [Elegant Networks: part 1, part 2, part 3]
06-01-2021: IBGP, IGP metrics, and administrative distances. [ipSpace] [Jeremy Filliben]
16-12-2020: Bad ACLs caused BGP route withdrawal for Google's Euro-cloud. [The Register]
08-12-2020: Current work in BGP security. [Russ White]
19-04-2020: New Cloudflare tool can tell you if your ISP has deployed BGP fixes. [Wired] [Is BGP Safe Yet]
11-04-2020: Citing BGP hijacks and hack attacks, feds want China Telecom out of the US. [Ars Technica]
21-02-2020: One year of BGP (in)security. [NANOG 78 YouTube]
12-08-2019: BGP hijackings take on new meaning in cybersecurity climate. [IT Pro Today]
24-06-2019: Verizon BGP super-blunder. [The Register] [Network Collective] [Forwarding Plane]
09-06-2019: BGP event sends European mobile traffic through China Telecom for 2 hours. [Ars Technica] [The Register]
24-05-2019: If you worry about 768k day, you're probably doing it wrong. [ipSpace]
13-03-2019: Facebook outage caused by BGP routing error. [HardOCP] [Bleeping Computer] [Outage Report]
26-02-2019: Four years of breaking HTTPS with BGP hijacking. [NANOG 75 YouTube]
22-12-2018: How 3ve’s BGP hijackers eluded the Internet—and made $29M. [Ars Technica] [Schneier]
24-10-2018: China's hacking of BGP. [Schneier] [USF] [Russ White] [Ars Technica]
30-09-2018: BGP peering updates. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
06-09-2018: NIST backs internet route security. [The Register]
28-08-2018: IPv6 causes peering issues between top networks. [The Register]
01-08-2018: Telegram redirected through Iran by baffling BGP leak. [The Register]
01-08-2018: Monitoring BGP anomalies. [Russ White] [APNIC Blog]
24-07-2018: An update on securing BGP from IETF 102. [Geoff Huston]
17-07-2018: Shutting down a BGP hijack factory. [Russ White] [Dyn]
10-07-2018: BGP broken? Blame the net's big providers. [The Register] [APNIC Blog]
09-07-2018: Recent BGP peering enhancements. [Russ White]
05-06-2018: The hijacking of 1.1.1.1. [Russ White] [Internet Society]
22-05-2018: Playing "Battleships" using BGP. [The Register] [ipSpace] [BenJojo]
01-05-2018: Canned response to BGP networking question. [EtherealMind] [Reddit]
02-03-2018: When will BGP become unfashionable? [Packet Pushers] [EtherealMind]
10-01-2018: Fat fingers strike again. [ipSpace] [puck.nether.net]
08-01-2018: BGP in 2017. [Geoff Huston] [Russ White]
13-12-2017: Suspicious BGP event routed big traffic sites through Russia. [The Register] [Ars Technica]
06-11-2017: Fat-fingered Level 3 techie reduces internet to level zero: glitch knocks out connections. [The Register] [DC Knowledge]
04-10-2017: Recent BGP Innovations for Operational Challenges. [NANOG YouTube]
06-09-2017: What's wrong with BGP. [Russ White] [Packet Pushers]
08-08-2017: RFC 8212 - bringing sane defaults to eBGP. [ipSpace] [RFC 8212] [RIPE]
19-06-2017: Internet boffins take aim at BGP route leaks. [The Register]
12-05-2017: Improving peering relationships in Japan. [Russ White] [APNIC Blog]
12-05-2017: Open source project SNAS taps BGP telemetry. [Packet Pushers]
07-02-2017: Survey of interconnection agreements. [NANOG YouTube]
31-01-2017: BGP in 2016. [Russ White] [Geoff Huston]
01-02-2017: Response: BGP in 2016. [EtherealMind]
08-01-2017: Iran censored porn so hard it broke the internet in Hong Kong. [Engadget] [Gizmodo] [The Verge]
09-12-2016: Slimming down the Internet routing table. [Redpill Linpro] [EtherealMind]
07-11-2016: The death of transit. [Russ White] [CircleID]
17-05-2016: BGP: the application networking dream. [Networking Nerd]
29-01-2016: BGP in 2015. [Geoff Huston]
12-03-2015: Indian ISP’s routing hiccup briefly takes Google down worldwide. [Ars Technica]
21-01-2015: BGP in 2014. [Geoff Huston]
10-11-2014: Russian internet traffic detours through China's Frankfurt outpost. [The Register]
26-09-2014: Internet Transit price falls slowing: Telegeography. [The Register]
14-08-2014: Snowden: The NSA, not Assad, took Syria off the Internet in 2012. [Ars Technica] [Gizmodo] [HotForSecurity]
18-08-2014: Do you really need to see all 512k Internet routes? [ipSpace] [NZ Herald]
13-08-2014: Brace for the BGPocalypse: big disruptions loom as internet overgrowth continues. [ExtremeTech] [Renesys] [Ars Technica] [BBC News]
06-05-2014: Global IPv4 routing table hits 500k routes. [PacketLife]
06-05-2014: You won’t get better internet until old one is broken. 500K BGP routes good start. [EtherealMind]
18-02-2014: BGP in 2013 -- the churn report. [Geoff Huston]
24-01-2014: BGP in 2013. [Geoff Huston]
21-11-2013: How somebody forced the world's Internet traffic through Belarus and Iceland. [WSJ ATD]
20-06-2013: Verizon: that peering flab about Netflix is Cogent's fault. [GigaOM]
15-02-2013: Fight to keep YouTube online in Egypt. [BuzzFeed]
29-12-2012: Pakistan lifts YouTube ban for 3 minutes. [BoingBoing] [NYT] [BBC News]
09-12-2012: Why dictators (don't) shut down the Internet. [Schneier] [BoingBoing] [Vice]
29-11-2012: Syria experiencing Internet blackout. [DC Knowledge] [BBC News] [WSJ ATD] [Wired] [Gizmodo] [Engadget] [Stuff] [THG]
29-11-2012: Syria's throwing of the Internet kill switch raises lots of questions. [WSJ ATD]
29-11-2012: How Syria turned off the Internet. [CloudFlare] [Gizmodo]
30-11-2012: Syrian Internet outage raises question "Could it happen here?" [WSJ ATD] [Renesys] [DC Knowledge] [Gizmodo]
04-12-2012: Internet shut-down easier in more countries than you think. [The Register]
30-11-2012: Syrian Internet blackout continues for second day. [BoingBoing] [NYT]
30-11-2012: Anonymous declares war on Syrian government sites. [THG]
30-11-2012: For Syria's rebel movement, Skype is a useful and increasingly dangerous tool. [NYT]
02-12-2012: Syrian Internet largely restored after blackout. [NZ Herald] [WSJ ATD] [Engadget] [Gizmodo] [CNN] [Stuff]
02-12-2012: Paint it black -- how Syria methodically erased itself from the Internet. [Ars Technica]
07-11-2012: How an Indonesian ISP took down the mighty Google for 30 minutes. [Ars Technica] [CloudFlare]
08-08-2012: A BGP leak made in Canada. [BGPmon]
06-07-2012: Internet outage in Lebanon continues into second day. [BGPmon]
09-04-2012: Iran preps Internet cutoff. [The Register] [IBT] [Gizmodo]
09-04-2012: Iran plans to unplug the Internet, launch its own "clean" alternative. [Ars Technica]
10-04-2012: Iran isn't shutting down the Internet in August, merely building a new one next March. [Gizmodo]
27-02-2012: How the Internet in Australia went down under. [BGPmon]
21-08-2011: The battle for Tripoli's Internet. [Renesys]
03-06-2011: Internet Syria offline. [BGPmon] [Renesys] [The Register]
04-06-2011: Internet service mostly restored in Syria. [WSJ]
26-03-2011: Facebook's detour through China and Korea. [BGPmon]
04-03-2011: Libya's Internet goes down again. [Gizmodo]
04-03-2011: Libya's Internet goes dark as upheaval spreads. [The Register]
05-03-2011: Internet access blocked across much of Libya. [Engadget]
29-01-2011: Egypt falls off the Internet. [BGPmon]
27-01-2011: Egyptian networks turn off the Internet. [DC Knowledge]
28-01-2011: How Egypt turned off the Internet. [Gizmodo]
28-01-2011: How Egypt killed the Internet. [WSJ]
28-01-2011: How to foil a nationwide shutdown. [Lifehacker --> use US proxy]
28-01-2011: Block like an Egyptian. [Slate]
29-01-2011: Without the Internet, Egyptians find new ways to get online. [Computer World]
29-01-2011: Recent events in Egypt. [Tor]
31-01-2011: Internet traffic in Egypt drops. [Geekzone]
31-01-2011: Egypt's net on life support. [Renesys]
31-01-2011: Egypt shuts down Noor, its last ISP. [TechCrunch]
01-02-2011: Egypt Internet ban lingers, users adjusting. [DailyTech]
01-02-2011: Egypt loses last vestiges of connectivity. [The Register]
02-02-2011: Egypt Internet back up as protests turn violent in Cairo. [Ars Technica]
02-02-2011: Egypt Internet restored, Cairo protests turn violent. [Wired]
03-02-2011: Vodafone network "hijacked" by Egypt. [BBC News]
03-02-2011: Vodafone says Egyptian government hijacked its networks to send propaganda. [Forbes]
04-02-2011: Vodafone Egypt confirms data services back, forced to send SMS supporting Egyptian government. [Geekzone]
06-02-2011: How Google removed the muzzle on Twitter in Egypt. [Yahoo]
09-02-2011: Internet role in Egypt's protests. [BBC News]
10-02-2011: Egypt turned off the Net with a big switch, not phone calls. [Gizmodo]
21-02-2011: Was Egypt's 'kill switch' the big red button? [DC Knowledge]
15-01-2011: Hijacks by AS4761 - INDOSAT - a quick report. [BGPmon]
03-12-2010: Chinese BGP incident: was it a traffic hijack? [IOS Hints]
01-12-2010: Comcast vs Level 3 peering dispute:
01-12-2010: Internet peering disputes: follow the money. [IOS Hints]
01-12-2010: Comcast vs Level 3. [PacketLife]
01-12-2010: Comcast vs Level 3 feud stirs intense debate. [DC Knowledge]
02-12-2010: Comcast: we bent over backwards to help Level 3. [Ars Technica]
Older Articles
Taming the BGP reconfiguration transients. [ipSpace] [MANRS]
History of BGP route leaks. [ipSpace]
Will network devices reject BGP sessions from unknown sources? [ipSpace]
Path hunting in BGP. [Lost In Transit]
BGP session security - be very skeptical. [ipSpace]
Fix BGP route leaks. [ipSpace]
Classification of BGP route leaks. [ipSpace]
Default eBGP policy (RFC 8212). [ipSpace]
Service insertion with BGP FlowSpec. [ipSpace]
Modifying BGP behaviour with xBGP API. [ipSpace]
Small-site eBGP-only design. [ipSpace]
Advantages of using Generalised TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) with eBGP. [ipSpace]
History of IP TTL in eBGP sessions. [ipSpace] [Network Fun Times]
Alternatives to iBGP within multihomed sites. [ipSpace]
Improve BGP startup time on Cisco IOS. [ipSpace]
BGP unnumbered duct tape. [ipSpace]
BGP route reflectors in the forwarding path. [ipSpace]
Leave BGP Next Hops unchanged on reflected routes. [ipSpace]
Why do we need iBGP full mesh? [ipSpace]
The puzzle of peering with Kentik. [Networking Nerd]
Router servers and loops. [Russ White]
Modifying admin distance of specific BGP routes. [Lost In Transit]
Revisiting BGP convergence. [Russ White]
Learning BGP:
Module 1, Lesson 1: Why BGP? [Packet Pushers]
Module 1, Lesson 2: How BGP builds loop-free paths. [Packet Pushers]
Module 1, Lesson 3: How BGP really converges. [Packet Pushers] [Russ White]
Module 1, Lesson 4: Intra-AS model and route reflectors. [Packet Pushers] [Russ White]
Module 2, Lesson 1: Peering part 1. [Packet Pushers]
Module 2, Lesson 2: Peering part 2. [Packet Pushers]
Module 2, Lesson 3: Messages and updates. [Packet Pushers]
Module 2, Lesson 4: Best path. [Packet Pushers]
Module 2, Lesson 5: BGP communities. [Packet Pushers]
Module 2, Lesson 6: Next hops. [Packet Pushers]
On securing BGP. [Russ White]
BGP authentication - use TCP/AO instead of MD5. [Packet Pushers]
BGP labelled unicast interoperability challenges. [ipSpace]
BGP labelled unicast on Cisco IOS. [ipSpace]
BGP policies. [Russ White: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6, part 7]
Performance testing of commercial BGP stacks. [ipSpace] [Elegant Network] [Github]
Running BGP between VMs and DC fabric. [ipSpace]
Mixed feelings about BGP RR Cluster ID. [ipSpace]
BGP RR myths. [ipSpace]
Three dimensions of BGP address family nerd knobs. [ipSpace]
Recursive BGP next hops -- an RFC 4271 quirk. [ipSpace, feedback]
Ironing out the BGP ruffles. [ipSpace] [LastWeekInAWS]
Building a BGP anycast lab. [ipSpace]
Optimal BGP path selection with BGP additional paths. [ipSpace]
Dynamic negotiation of BGP capabilities. [ipSpace] [ipSpace]
Utilising BGP communities for traffic steering.
Part 1: firewalls. [StubArea51]
Part 2: state management across DCs. [StubArea51]
Part 3: customer BGP traffic engineering. [StubArea51]
Part 4: active/active DC. [StubArea51]
Creating BGP multipath lab with netsim-tools. [ipSpace]
BGP optimal route reflection 101. [ipSpace]
BGP private AS range. [ipSpace] [Network Fun Times]
BGP security with Geoff Huston. [Russ White]
A survey on securing inter-domain routing:
Part 1 - BGP: Design, threats and security requirements. [Geoff Huston]
Why do we need BGP-LS? [ipSpace]
Unequal cost multipath with BGP DMZ link bandwidth. [ipSpace]
Rethinking BGP in the DC. [ipSpace] [CHI-NOG YouTube]
BGP-free MPLS core with segment routing. [ipSpace]
The effectiveness of AS Path Prepending. [Russ White: part 1, part 2]
Hunting down stuck BGP routes. [Benjojo] [EtherealMind]
How important is BGP RPKI? [ipSpace]
Does BGP need link state? [Packet Pushers]
AS Path Prepending -- there is no rose without a thorn. [NANOG 80]
Finding and profiling BGP serial hijackers. [NANOG 80]
Excessive BGP AS Path prepending is a self inflicted vulnerability. [NANOG 79 YouTube]
BGP AS numbers on MLAG members. [ipSpace]
BGP hell is other people. [Networking Nerd]
Understanding Internet peering. [Russ White]
BGP 4-byte ASN. [Packet Pushers]
Demystifying BGP session establishments. [Packet Pushers]
BGP as a high-availability protocol.
Facts and fiction: BGP is a hot mess. [ipSpace]
BGP and car safety. [ipSpace]
Designing a workflow to respond to BGP incidents. [NANOG YouTube]
Path prepending in BGP. [Geoff Huston]
Redundant BGP connectivity on a single ISP connection. [ipSpace]
Changing IOS BGP policies based on IP-SLA measurements. [ipSpace]
Why is securing BGP just so damn hard? [Geoff Huston]
Challenges, opportunities and the evolution of Internet peering. [Network Computing]
BGP route security. [NANOG YouTube]
BGP confederations. [ipCisco]
BGP route reflector. [ipCisco]
The BGP monitoring tool (BMP). [Russ White]
BGP community attribute. [ipCisco]
BGP communities. [Russ White]
Why BGP visibility is more important than ever. [Network Computing]
What designs require BGP in the DC? [Packet Pushers]
BGP peering in the real world. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
Understanding BGP table version. [Networking with Fish: part 1, part 2, part 3]
BGP show and tell. [ipSpace] [Networking with Fish]
Duplicate BGP updates. [Russ White]
Peering with providers. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
BGP routers and parrots. [Russ White]
Optimal BGP route reflection. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
Next hop self. [Russ White]
BGP LLGR. [Vincent Bernat]
BGP DFZ security. [Russ White] [CircleID]
BGP and sub-optimal route reflection. [Russ White]
History of networking: BGP route servers. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
BGP security: a gentle reminder that networking is business. [Russ White]
Is BGP good enough? [Russ White]
Flowspec for BGP route servers at IXPs. [NANOG YouTube]
Architecting robust BGP policies. [NANOG YouTube]
DDoS evolution and enhancing DDoS protection with BGP flowspec. [NANOG YouTube]
Dissecting iBGP and eBGP JUNOS configuration. [ipSpace]
History of networking: BGP security. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
RIPE NCC: the future of BGP security. [Russ White] [YouTube]
Securing BGP. [Network Collective]
Inferring BGP blackholing activity in the Internet. [NANOG 72 YouTube]
Using ARIN Whois data in BGP prefix filters. [NANOG 72 YouTube]
Do we really need a new BGP? [APNIC Blog]
Response. [EtherealMind]
BGP traffic engineering. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
Section 10 routing loops. [Russ White]
BGP route selection -- a failure of intent-based networking. [ipSpace] [Russ White]
Flowspec and RFC1998? [Russ White]
Do we really need a new BGP? [Russ White]
BGP: the tragedy of the commons. [ipSpace]
Should we build a better BGP? [Networking Nerd]
Data center BGP: autonomous systems and AS numbers. [ipSpace, ipSpace]
BGP peering and reachability. [Network Collective] [Russ White]
BGP as a better IGP -- when and where. [ipSpace]
BGPsec and reality. [Russ White]
BGP Large Community for Route Leak Detection. [NANOG YouTube]
History of networking - Tony Li - BGP. [Network Collective, YouTube] [Russ White]
Improving BGP convergence without tweaking BGP timers. [ipSpace]
BGP churn and Add Path. [Network Collective, YouTube] [Russ White]
Synchronising BGP and OSPF. [ipSpace]
BGP persistent oscillation. [Russ White]
History of networking - BGP optimisations. [Network Collective, Russ White, YouTube]
Are more specifics harmful? [Russ White] [APNIC Blog]
The impact of more specifics in the DFZ. [Russ White] [Geoff Huston]
PBGPP makes analysing BGP data easier. [Russ White] [APNIC Blog]
BGP optimal route reflection. [NANOG YouTube]
When BGP meets big data. [NANOG YouTube]
Optimal route reflection. [Russ White]
Leaky abstraction: an example. [Russ White]
High performance BGP security - algorithms and architectures. [NANOG YouTube]
BGP best path selection modifications. [NANOG YouTube]
TralXroute detecting IXPs in traceroute paths. [NANOG YouTube]
BGP shutdown. [NANOG YouTube]
PCAP BGP parser. [NANOG YouTube]
BGP basics: internal and external BGP. [Network Computing]
BGP Flowspec indirection. [Russ White]
BGP security: preventing bad route propagation. [Network Computing]
Large BGP communities. [Russ White] [APNIC]
Optimal inter-AS routing challenge. [ipSpace]
BGP security: mitigating route leaks. [Network Computing]
21st century iBGP route reflection. [NANOG 68 YouTube]
Large BGP communities. [NANOG 68 YouTube]
BGP Flowspec is a step forward. [Russ White] [Netcraftsmen]
How BGP Flowspec mitigates DDoS. [Network Computing]
Running BGP between virtual machine and ToR switch. [ipSpace]
BGP attributes: Weight, Local Preference, AS Path, Origin, MED. [ipCisco]
Absorbing DDoS with communities. [Russ White]
Aggregation pixies. [Russ White] [APNIC Blog]
Snaproute BGP code dive:
Installation - part 1. [Russ White]
Installation - part 2. [Russ White]
Installation - part 3. [Russ White]
Starting a peer - part 1. [Russ White]
Starting a peer - part 2. [Russ White]
Starting a peer - part 3. [Russ White]
Moving to Connect. [Russ White]
Moving to Open - part 1. [Russ White]
Moving to Open - part 2. [Russ White]
Moving to Established. [Russ White]
Moving to OpenConfirm. [Russ White]
Moving to Established. [Russ White]
Finding the tail of the update chain. [Russ White]
First steps in processing an update. [Russ White]
Fat-thumbed a BGP entry? Relax, now your pain has a name. [The Register] [RFC 7908]
Is BGP really that complex? [ipSpace]
When prepend fails, what next? [Russ White: part 1, part 2, part 3]
BGP security and spam. [Russ White]
Running BGP RR in a VM. [ipSpace]
Six tips on improving BGP security. [Network Computing] [Russ White]
BGP route maps and continued feature limitations. [ipSpace]
On collaborative blocking and filtering. [Russ White] [Internet Society]
BGP convergence, divergence, and the 'net. [Russ White]
Rethinking path validation:
Part 1 [Russ White] [LinkedIn Blog]
Part 2 [Russ White] [LinkedIn Blog]
Running BGP on servers. [ipSpace]
Using BGP in data center fabrics. [ipSpace]
Securing BGP: a case study. [Russ White: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6, part 7, part 8, part 9, part 10]
Rethinking path validation. [Russ White, YouTube]
BGP in an Arista data center. [Aspiring Networker]
BGP security. [Russ White]
BGPSEC operation:
Basic operation. [Packet Pushers]
Protections offered. [Packet Pushers]
Replays, timers, and performance. [Packet Pushers]
Signatures and performance. [Packet Pushers]
Leaks and leaks. [Packet Pushers]
Estimating BGP convergence time. [ipSpace]
BGP communities. [Router Jockey]
BGP deaggregation with conditional route injection. [ipSpace]
AS-Path filtering. [Router Jockey]
Use BGP to defend against a DDoS attack originating from remote AS. [StackExchange]
Do you really need to see all 512k Internet routes? [ipSpace] [NZ Herald]
What is a valid BGP route? [ipSpace]
The accumulated IGP metric for BGP. [MellowD]
Why BGP choose wrong Next-hop address? [StackExchange]
Making everything a Route Reflector? [Reddit]
Question about Nexus 7000, eBGP and sub-interfaces. [Reddit]
Changes in iBGP next hop processing drastically improves BGP-based DMVPN designs. [ipSpace]
Why don't network providers peer better? [Reddit]
Real life BGP route originator and BGP next-hop intricacies. [ipSpace]
Why BGP implements its own keepalive instead of using tcp keepalive? [StackExchange]
Cisco: reliable fast BGP failover when mixing BGP NHT and BFD. [StackExchange]
Should I use default routes or full BGP table? [StackExchange]
BGP preferring routes with longer as-path prepend? [Reddit]
Multihomed BGP and NAT. [StackExchange]
Active / Active BGP with Default routes. [StackExchange]
BGP peering in the datacenter with a Root server. [Reddit]
Why does export/import policy addition/removal cause a BGP session reset? [StackExchange]
How could MTU affect BGP sessions? [CostiSer]
Learned eBGP routes not distributed to iBGP neighbors. [StackExchange]
BGP Autonomous System Path Duplicate AS. [StackExchange]
MITM and routing security. [Geoff Huston]
Cisco BGP - see communities on advertised-routes? [StackExchange]
Is it possible to connect two private eBGP peers with the same AS number? [StackExchange]
After TCP is established which BGP peer will send open message first? [StackExchange]
BGP routing in DMVPN networks. [ipSpace]
10-11-2013: What is the need of iBGP inside an Autonomous system as IGP protocols fulfill the need for internal communication. [StackExchange]
iBGP migrations can generate forwarding loops. [ipSpace]
Exception routing with BGP: SDN done right. [ipSpace]
Can BGP route reflectors really generate forwarding loops? [ipSpace]
BGP regular expression ".+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+_.+". [StackExchange]
Local Policy Denied Prefixes” in 'show ip bgp neighbor' output. [StackExchange]
How would one route an IP network through different ISPs? [StackExchange]
Originate customer AS. [StackExchange]
Seamless BGP configuration (or why BGP is a poor routing protocol). [EtherealMind]
More private AS numbers. [ipSpace]
BGP multipath with different ASNs feasible for production networks? [StackExchange]
BGP simulation tool. [StackExchange]
Circular BGP propagation. [StackExchange]
How can I check to see if I'm receiving MEDs? [StackExchange]
Load balancing between two ISP BGP links. [StackExchange]
Routing traffic out different links from the same BGP AS. [StackExchange]
BGP Best External explained. [ipSpace]
BGP security draft adopted as IETF workgroup document. [ipSpace]
BGP convergence optimisation. [ipSpace]
Setting no-export BGP community. [ipSpace]
Beware of the pre-bestpath cost extended BGP community. [ipSpace]
BGP route reflection in MPLS/VPN PE-routers. [ipSpace]
BGP operations and security, second draft. [ipSpace] [IETF Draft]
Implications of BGP local-as on IOS. [PacketLife]
My first Internet draft has just been published. [ipSpace]
Filter inbound BGP prefixes: summary. [ipSpace]
How could we filter extraneous BGP prefixes? [ipSpace]
BGP-free SP core in pictures. [ipSpace]
BGP Route Preference -- the most commonly missed task in R&S CCIE mock lab 2. [CCIE Blog]
Understanding BGP MED and BGP Deterministic MED. [CCIE Blog]
Responsible generation of BGP default route. [IOS Hints]
Shut down BGP session based on tracked object. [IOS Hints]
BGP next-hop processing. [IOS Hints]
IBGP or EBGP in an enterprise network? [IOS Hints]
BGP/IGP network design principles. [IOS Hints]
Death of the Internet predicted, film at your local cineplex. [Ars Technica]
A brief history of notable Internet disruptions. [PacketLife]
IBGP and an IGP. [PacketLife]
Validating BGP announcements with RPKI. [BGPmon]
How accurate is the routing registry? [Fix6]
How complete is the RIPE routing registry? [CircleID]
Routing on the Internet: a disaster waiting to happen? [Slashdot] [Security Week]
Understanding the Internet's insecure routing infrastructure. [Ars Technica]
Understanding BGP convergence. [CCIE Blog]
Network dictionary -- BGP speaker. [Etherealmind]
BGP: time to grow up. [IOS Hints]
Riddle me this, BGP man... [CCIE Blog]
Interesting BGP/IGP interaction problem. [IOS Hints] [Jeremy Filliben]
BGP path manipulation: Bob is at it again. [CCIE Blog]
Why BGP uses TCP and IGPs don't. [Packet Life]
BGP redistribution with OSPF and statics. [Etherealmind]
BGP: the big gory protocol -- can you troubleshoot it? [CCIE Blog]
Optimising IP event dampening. [CCIE Blog]
BGP proportional load balancing. [CCIE Blog]
Secure BGP. [IOS Hints]
Anomalies in BGP (Part 1). [CCIE Blog]
How the 'Net works: an introduction to peering and transit. [Ars Technica]
Scale your Internet backbone with core MPLS, BGP on the edge. [IOS Hints] [TechTarget]
BGP Details
Uses TCP port 179.
Sends keepalives every 60 seconds.
Within AS, must have full iBGP peering mesh, which leads to scaling problems that are resolved by:
route reflectors
confederations
Once "Established", BGP Updates are exchanged containing NLRI information:
destination prefix
prefix length
AS path
next hop
attributes
Route Selection
Next hop reachable (via IGP)?
Local preference.
Weight (Cisco): highest.
AS path: shortest.
MED: lowest.
Lowest cost next hop (IGP).
eBGP route: lowest BGP identifier.
iBGP route: lowest BGP identifier
Attributes
Well-known mandatory: must be supported.
AS path, next hop, origin.
Well-known discretionary: must be supported.
Local pref
Optional transitive: may not be supported.
Community
Optional non-transitive: may not be supported.
MED
Other Stuff
Communities: allows prefixes with the same community to be treated with the same policy (i.e. tagging prefixes).
MED: advertise "route preference" to peer (influence only).
Route flap dampening: the internet community is moving away from this.
Internet route table growth: approx. 200k routes in mid-October 2006.
IOS Basic Config
router bgp <AS>
no synchronization
timers bgp x y
neighbor <peer-group-name> peer-group
neighbor <peer-group-name> remote-as <AS>
neighbor <peer-group-name> update-source lo0
neighbor <peer-group-name> soft-reconfig inbound
neighbor x.x.x.x peer-group <peer-group-name>
neighbor x.x.x.x description <...>
JUNOS Basic Config
protocol
bgp
group <name>
type [internal|external]
description <...>
local-address x.x.x.x
authentication-key <...>
peer-as <AS>
neighbor x.x.x.x
export <policy-options-name>
family inet
any
prefix limit x
teardown x idle-timeout y
import <policy-options-name>
export <policy-options-name>
interface <...>
unit 0
family inet
filter
input <filter-name>
output <filter-name>
firewall
filter <filter-name>
term <term-name>
from <...>
then [accept|reject|discard]
The basics: [ipSpace]
Redistribute IGP information into BGP. [ipSpace]
Bidirectional route redistribution. [ipSpace]
Protect eBGP sessions. [ipSpace]
Use BFD to speed up convergence. [ipSpace]
Route aggregation. [ipSpace]
TCP-AO protection of BGP sessions. [ipSpace]
Build larger networks with iBGP. [ipSpace]
Multivendor external routers. [ipSpace]
Build a transit network with iBGP. [ipSpace]
Using Local Preference. [ipSpace]
Using Multi-Exit Discriminator. [ipSpace]
AS-path prepending. [ipSpace]
Set BGP communities on outgoing updates. [ipSpace]
Using BGP route reflectors. [ipSpace]
Use BGP communities in a routing policy. [ipSpace]
Reuse BGP AS number across sites. [ipSpace]
Work with FRR and Cumulus Linux. [ipSpace]
Override AS neighbour AS number in AS Path. [ipSpace]
Use multiple AS numbers on the same router. [ipSpace]
Session templates. [ipSpace]
Remove private AS from AS Path. [ipSpace]
Policy templates. [ipSpace]
Control plane daemons, BIRD, dnsmasq. [ipSpace]
Limit the number of accepted BGP prefixes. [ipSpace]
Stop the fat-finger incidents. [ipSpace]
Advertise the default route. [ipSpace]
Build BGP-free MPLS core network. [ipSpace]
© Robert Larsen. All rights reserved.